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ABSTRACT 
The behaviour of presupposition triggers in human language has been 
extensively studied and given rise to many distinct theoretical proposals. 
One intuitively appealing way of characterising presupposition is to 
argue that it constitutes backgrounded meaning, which does not 
contribute to updating the conversational record, and consequently may 
not be challenged or refuted by discourse participants. However, there 
are a wide range of presupposition triggers, some of which can 
systematically be used to introduce new information. Is there, then, a 
clear psychological distinction between presupposition and assertion? 
Do certain expressions vacillate between presupposing and asserting 
information? And is information backgrounding a categorical or a 
gradient phenomenon? In this paper we argue for the value of 
experimental methods in addressing these questions, and present a pilot 
study demonstrating backgrounding effects of presupposition triggers, 
and suggesting their gradience in nature. We discuss the implications of 
these findings for theoretical categorisations of presupposition triggers. 
Keywords: presuppositions; accommodation; experimental pragmatics; 
information structure; QUD. 
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In conversation, information is exchanged in several different ways. One 
dimension of variation concerns the foregrounding and backgrounding of 
information. A speaker may introduce information that is available for the other 
conversational participants to accept or reject, and at the same time introduce 
other information that is in some sense ‘taken for granted’, which is typically 
not available for discussion. The former class of information is considered 
“foregrounded” and the latter “backgrounded”. 
Natural languages provide various devices to allow speakers to manipulate 
information structure in this way. These include lexical items such as stop, 
only, manage, again, and so on; and syntactic devices such as cleft 
constructions. For example, the speaker of (1) is understood to foreground the 
prediction that Balotelli will start the match (a point that invites potential 
disagreement), while describing him in the backgrounded content as an 
“outstanding striker” (in a way that does not invite disagreement). Similarly, 
the speaker of (2) foregrounds the prediction that Balotelli will be sent off, 
backgrounding the information that this has happened before. 
(1) Balotelli, who is an outstanding striker, will start the match. 
(2) Balotelli will be sent off again. 
From a theoretical perspective (both philosophical and linguistic), various 
attempts have been made to characterise the difference between the 
foregrounded and backgrounded content of sentences. One influential 
approach asserts that the foregrounded meaning is that which contributes to 
context update (Stalnaker, 1976; Lewis, 1979) and addresses the Question 
Under Discussion (QUD; Roberts, 1996). However, the appropriate 
treatment of backgrounded content is relatively unclear, due to a great extent 
to the heterogeneity of this type of content. 
From the perspective of experimental semantics and pragmatics, this issue 
invites empirical attack. Despite the intuitively appealing nature of the 
theoretical analysis, there is as yet little evidence that the distinction between 
foregrounded and backgrounded content is a psychologically real one for 
native speakers of a language. In particular, one might question whether these 
are the appropriate levels of description, or whether the heterogeneity of 
backgrounded content is also reflected at a psycholinguistic level. We can 
consider whether types of linguistic content that admit a unified theoretical 
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analysis also exhibit a comparable level of unity when they are used to elicit 
behavioural data from linguistically untrained participants (and conversely 
whether theoretically distinctive materials yield unexpectedly similar 
behavioural signatures). We wish to know, broadly speaking, whether the 
various ways of manipulating information structure (distinguished from one 
another on theoretical or philosophical grounds) actually differ from one 
another at a psychological or behavioural level.  
Recent work in experimental pragmatics has attempted to apply some of the 
psycholinguistic techniques used in research on implicature (Bott & Noveck, 
2004, among many others) to the problem of information structure. In 
particular, attention has focused on presupposition triggers, with respect both 
to their ability to background information and their ability to “project” 
semantic content. This study examines the former attribute, but both are 
discussed in the following section. 
1. Presupposition phenomena in 
 experimental semantics and pragmatics 
Lexical items such as again, stop, and so on are customarily analysed as 
presupposition triggers. These have two distinctive properties: first, as 
discussed above, they tend to signal the presence of further meaningful content 
(the “presupposition”), additional to the main declarative meaning of the 
sentence, but intuitively less available for further discussion, e.g. for direct 
refutation. Secondly, unlike other forms of additional meaning such as (most) 
implicatures, presuppositions survive embedding under negation and other 
operators among the “family of sentences” tests (Chierchia & McConnell-
Ginet, 1990), while the declarative meaning does not. If we negate (2), as in 
(3), the presupposition (that Balotelli has been sent off in the past) remains 
intact. This is referred to as the presupposition “projecting” from under the 
scope of negation. 
(3) Balotelli will not be sent off again. 
These two properties have given rise to rich sets of competing theoretical 
proposals. With respect to projection, the question arises of how the 
presuppositions of a complex sentence are calculable from the presuppositions 
of the component sentences. At least two classes of theories have been 
advanced to account for this: the dynamic semantic approach advanced by 
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Heim (1983) and Van der Sandt (1992) aims to explain projection in terms of 
semantic composition, while the pragmatic approach endorsed by Schlenker 
(2008) appeals to principles of conversational organisation. 
The involvement of experimental work in addressing this question parallels 
the developments in the study of scalar implicature over the past 10 years. As 
in that case, competing theories can no longer be evaluated on the basis of 
introspection, as there is little controversy about the ultimate interpretation of 
the examples under discussion (Katsos & Cummins, 2010). The theories are 
instead distinguishable by the fact that they posit different processes, and 
therefore make distinctive predictions about the time-course of processing. 
For instance, in a case such as (4), it is not controversial that the 
presupposition (5) does not ultimately project, but it is also not introspectively 
clear whether the presupposition is calculated and then cancelled, or simply 
not calculated. 
(4) I didn’t know that whales are fish, because whales are not 
fish. 
(5) Whales are fish. 
For similar reasons, experimental work has recently commenced on the 
question of how presuppositions are backgrounded. An intuition is broadly 
shared in the literature that presupposed content is generally not addressable: 
that is, it is not possible for an interlocutor straightforwardly to object to a 
presupposition. Instead, infelicitous presuppositions must be dealt with in a 
more metalinguistic way, e.g. by objecting to the utterance as a whole. This 
observation underlies the “Hey, wait a minute” test (Shanon, 1976; von Fintel, 
2004). This test is proposed on the basis that presuppositions not in the 
common ground can be challenged as in (6), while assertions not in the 
common ground cannot. 
(6) A: John realised that whales are fish. 
 B: Hey, wait a minute! Whales are not fish. 
              *B: Hey, wait a minute! John didn’t realise that. 
However, the “Hey, wait a minute” test may not be the most sensitive 
diagnostic for presupposition per se; it seems felicitous to use “Hey, wait a 
minute” to object to any precondition of the utterance, no matter how obscure 
(and perhaps even to an aspect of foregrounded meaning, if it is particularly 
surprising). Moreover, there are good reasons to suppose that the delineation 
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of backgrounded and foregrounded content is not entirely straightforward. 
First, presuppositions differ in their logical relation to the content of the 
sentence (Zeevat, 1992), which could have implications for their 
addressability. Second, many researchers have observed differences in the 
family of presupposition triggers, e.g. between “soft” and “hard” triggers 
(Abusch, 2010), or have proposed a continuum ranging from structural “hard-
core” triggers like clefts to “heavily context-dependent presuppositions” not 
associated with any particular trigger (Kadmon, 2001). Third, presuppositions 
can be exploited to convey information in an assertion-like fashion, i.e. to 
introduce new information through accommodation (Lewis, 1979; Von Fintel, 
2000). Consequently, the relation between the two aspects of presupposition 
discussed above – the potential for presuppositional content to project, and its 
tendency to be informationally backgrounded – is not a trivial one.  
We discuss these issues in the following subsections of this paper, and then 
proceed to motivate and discuss a pilot study that aims to investigate the 
typology of presupposition triggers with respect to their backgrounding 
behaviour. In this case, the broad justification for experimental work is that 
subtle gradations in the acceptability of forms may exist but not be available to 
introspection. Our aim is to test the psychological reality of the distinctions 
that are posited. 
 
2. Resolution and lexical triggers 
Zeevat (1992) observed that presupposition triggers could be categorised into 
three broad classes, differing in the extent to which they are anaphoric 
(following Van der Sandt 1988). One class of triggers, including for instance 
definite descriptions, “collect entities from the environment in order to say 
new things about them” (Zeevat, 1992, p. 397). By analogy with the process of 
anaphora resolution, these are referred to as resolution triggers. The second 
class of triggers, termed lexical triggers by Zeevat, are lexical items that encode 
preconditions for their main declarative content. Stop and continue both have 
this property: in (7) and (8), it is logically necessary that John smoked at some 
point prior to the time of utterance. 
(7) John stopped smoking. 
(8) John continues to smoke. 
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The third class, typified by too and again, is also anaphoric, in that it 
involves the retrieval of an entity or eventuality previously salient in the 
discourse. Deviating from Zeevat’s use of the term, we will consider these also 
to be “resolution triggers”. Note in particular that the backgrounded content 
of such items is typically unrelated, logically speaking, to the foregrounded 
content. For instance, in (2) and (3), the backgrounded content (that Balotelli 
was sent off at some time in the past) neither entails nor is entailed by the 
foregrounded content (Balotelli being sent off in the past is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for him to be sent off in the future). Contrastingly, in 
(7) and (8) the relation between foregrounded and backgrounded content is 
closer, as each may only end or prolong a preceding eventuality.  
It is theoretically coherent to assume that all these categories of 
presuppositions behave in the same way, in respect of the foregrounding and 
backgrounding of information. However, intuitively, there appear to be 
important differences as regards the addressability of the presupposed content. 
For the resolution triggers, denial of the backgrounded content does not 
provide any information about the foregrounded content. For the lexical 
triggers, denial of the backgrounded content amounts to denying the truth of 
the statement as a whole. Therefore, it should be possible to address the 
presupposed content while at the same time addressing the QUD, in Roberts’s 
(1996) terms1. 
The question of whether there are psychologically real differences between 
the treatment of resolutional and lexical triggers by native speakers is an 
empirical one. A binary judgment such as the “Hey, wait a minute” test 
obviously does not distinguish different levels of backgrounding. From an 
experimental point of view, this suggests a role for a gradient acceptability 
judgement task, such as we use in the pilot study presented later in this paper2.  
 
3. Different strengths of presupposition trigger 
Several strands of research on presupposition share the intuition that there are 
further systematic differences that are not necessarily coterminous with the 
 
1
 Note that to Roberts, addressing the QUD involves entailing an answer to it, but no 
stipulation is made as to how direct this entailment relation must be. 
2
 We avoid using the “Hey, wait a minute” test in conjunction with a gradient judgment task, 
as there is a risk that the judgments will reflect the acceptability of using this particular kind of 
objection in different contexts, rather than being a direct measure of backgrounding. 
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above classes. Kadmon (2001) argues for a continuum of presuppositions, 
based on their projection behaviour (and specifically considerations such as 
cancellability and context-dependence). Von Fintel and Matthewson (2008) 
consider certain triggers, such as too and again, to be more strongly 
presuppositional than others. They situate this observation in the context of 
research by Abusch (see Abusch, 2010), proposing a distinction between 
“soft” and “hard” presupposition triggers, and Simons (2006), who argues 
that too and again serve no purpose within the sentence other than triggering a 
presupposition (which suggests that their presence should be a reliable cue to 
the presupposition being intended by the speaker). 
It is tempting to interpret this as a prediction that the strongest 
presupposition triggers should have the most pronounced backgrounding 
effects. However, this may be a misinterpretation. In fact, one might argue 
instead that the use of a sentence that goes out of its way explicitly to convey a 
presupposition should render that presupposition more addressable, in that its 
importance is heightened by comparison with the declarative content of the 
sentence. 
Once again, the role of experimental work here is to discern whether the 
intuitions of theoreticians have a psychological reality. We share the intuition 
that the class of presuppositions is diverse, both in respect of the nature of the 
material presupposed and in the extent to which that material is made 
cognitively salient, and consider that information structure is a useful measure 
of this. Our hope in this respect is that findings about the nature of 
backgrounding may enable us to help further refine the typology of 
presupposition triggers that has been proposed in the theoretical literature. 
 
4. Exploiting accommodation 
Another aspect of presupposition behaviour is that presuppositions can be 
used to convey additional information. When a sentence felicitously 
presupposes information that is not taken for granted in the context, that 
information is said to be accommodated (Lewis, 1979, drawing upon the work 
of Stalnaker 1976 i.a.). The possibility of exploiting accommodation to convey 
new information further blurs the distinction between foregrounded and 
backgrounded content. Consider for example (9). 
(9) I just found out that John is having an affair. 
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In terms of information structure, this sentence declares the fact of 
discovery (‘I just found out that p’) and presupposes the proposition ‘John is 
having an affair’3. However, intuitively, sentences such as (9) can also be used 
to assert the propositional content that appears to be presupposed. Moreover, 
felicitous responses to (9) appear more naturally to address that proposition 
than the overt declarative (“He isn’t!” seems a more likely response than “You 
didn’t!”) In short, the presupposition does not appear to be backgrounded to 
any appreciable extent in such a construction. 
Conversely, presuppositions can in principle be exploited to convey 
information that is controversial, with a view to adding this information to the 
common ground or causing the hearers to update their situation model 
accordingly. This is exploited in loaded questions, such as the classic example 
(10), where either a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response can be taken to endorse the 
presupposition of ‘stop’. Unlike examples such as (9), however, this technique 
exploits the fact that the presupposition is backgrounded, and is therefore 
difficult to address. 
(10) Have you stopped beating your wife yet? 
A general question here relates to how regularly speakers intend 
presuppositions to be accommodated: here we might make competing 
theoretical observations. On the one hand, the use of a presupposition is 
informationally redundant unless it goes to updating the situation model of the 
interlocutors in some way4. We might therefore expect that non-lexical 
triggers are canonically used to convey new information of some kind (e.g. 
again to convey explicitly that the event under discussion has happened 
before). On the other hand, if it is crucial that new information should be added 
to the interlocutors’ situation model, it might appear uncooperative for a 
speaker to convey this information in the form of a presupposition, where it 
cannot be easily contested if it is controversial, and where it might conceivably 
be overlooked entirely. This raises the very broad and much-discussed issue of 
how a speaker most efficiently conveys information to a hearer, and the specific 
question of how presuppositions enter into this process. 
 
3
 This is assumed to be a presupposition based on projection, specifically that “I didn’t just 
realise John is having an affair” also conveys that he is. 
4
 This might include bringing already known information more immediately to the attention of 
the interlocutor. 
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For the purpose of this research, the crucial point here is that the role of 
presupposition triggers in backgrounding information is potentially 
negotiable. It appears quite possible for theoretically similar constructions 
either to background the presupposition or to foreground it at the expense of 
the declarative content. This suggests that we should also be interested in case-
by-case variation among instances of identical triggers, as well as being 
concerned with the patterns that arise across the class(es) of triggers. 
 
5. Foregrounded and backgrounded presuppositions: 
 a pilot experimental study 
In our pilot study, we aimed to investigate the extent to which a set of 
presupposition triggers accomplish the backgrounding of their corresponding 
presuppositions. We selected as a sample of triggers the resolutional again, 
and the lexical stop and continue. We also considered only, a trigger with 
debatable status (presupposition or entailment; cf. Horn, 1969; 1996, 
Roberts to appear); and a syntactic resolution trigger, the comparative 
construction, using which for instance the sentence (11) presupposes (12)5. 
(11) Jane is a better doctor than Mike. 
(12) Mike is a doctor.  
5.1. Methodology 
Participants were presented with question-answer (Q-A) pairs and asked to 
rate, on a 1-5 scale, “how natural” the answer was. Response latencies were 
also measured and recorded. In the critical items, a presupposition trigger 
appears in the question, and the question was answered in the negative. In the 
“Foreground” condition, the negative answer addressed the foregrounded 
content of the question, as in (13); in the “Background” condition, the 
negative answer addressed the backgrounded content of the question, as in 
(14). 
(13) Q: Did Julia stop smoking? 
 A: No, she smokes. 
 
5
 This also projects from under the scope of negation: “Jane isn’t a better doctor than Mike” 
conveys that Mike is a doctor.  
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(14) Q: Did Julia stop smoking? 
 A: No, she didn’t use to smoke. 
For each trigger, two Q-A pairs were administered to each subject. Two 
versions of the experiment were constructed, such that the items presented in 
the Foreground condition in version 1 were presented in the Background 
condition in version 2, and vice versa. The experiment was implemented in E-
Prime. Participants (n=30) were native English speakers, recruited from the 
student body of the University of Cambridge, and were allocated randomly to 
either version 1 or version 2 of the experiment. 
5.2. Predictions 
Our general predictions are as follows. If native speakers are sensitive to the 
distinction between foregrounded and backgrounded information in 
discourse, Q-A pairs in the Foreground condition should receive higher 
naturalness ratings than those in the Background condition. Moreover, under 
the assumption that backgrounded information is harder to retrieve, we would 
predict a slowdown in response time (while we measure response time of the 
judgment, admittedly a more natural measure would be response time of the 
reading time of the critical segment). Comparing the resolutional to the lexical 
triggers, we would expect the acceptability of negating backgrounded 
information in the latter case to be higher than in the former case, as for lexical 
triggers the presupposition is entailed by the declarative content of the 
sentence, and therefore its failure is sufficient reason to give a felicitous 
negative response to the sentence. 
5.3. Results 
Results for the triggers continue, stop and only are as follows. As the materials 
with again and the comparative gave rise to unintended ambiguities in one test 
condition in this pilot study6, we are unable to report counterbalanced results 
for these triggers. The following results are based upon each participant’s 
 
6
 The problematic sentences described two individuals of the same gender; in these cases, as 
well as a reading of ‘he’ or ‘she’ in which the presupposition was contested, there was a 
possible reading in which the declarative content was contested. 
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rating of two items for each trigger, both with either foreground continuations 
(for 15 participants) or background continuations (for the other 15). 
 
Trigger Mean rating (SD) Mean response time, ms (SD) 
Foreground Background Foreground Background 
Again 4.13 (0.97) 2.87 (1.11) 4509 (2906) 4052 (3268) 
comparative 4.37 (1.00) 2.60 (0.77) 3460 (2006) 4464 (3080) 
 
These preliminary results show that, as predicted, refutations in foreground 
conditions are preferred to those in background conditions for each type of 
presupposition trigger. Paired t-tests applied to the counterbalanced 
conditions reveal a highly significant preference in judgements for foreground 
rather than background conditions (all p < 0.001). Similar planned 
comparisons using paired t-tests for response times also show a preference for 
foreground conditions over background (continue, t = 1.68, p < 0.05; stop, t 
= 2.40, p < 0.01; only, t = 3.55, p < 0.001; all one-tailed). 
Between triggers, comparisons show a significant preference in the 
background condition for only versus stop (t = 3.46, p < 0.001 two-tailed) and 
for only versus continue (t = 3.08, p < 0.01 two-tailed). However, these 
preferences are also significant in the foreground condition, as is the 
preference for continue versus stop which does not approach significance in 
the background condition (only versus stop, t = 5.48, p < 0.001 two-tailed; 
only versus continue, t = 2.77, p < 0.01 two-tailed; continue versus stop, t = 
2.70, p < 0.01 two-tailed). Each of these comparisons remains significant at p 
< 0.05 with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 
Note that the reaction times exhibit a great deal of variability, possibly 
because these also include reading times. There is a numerical preference for 
foreground conditions; the exception is again, but this may reflect the failure to 
counterbalance materials in this condition. 
5.4. Discussion 
The results of this pilot study demonstrate that native speakers are sensitive to 
the distinction between foregrounded and backgrounded information, and that 
this is accessible to a methodology involving naturalness ratings of dialogue 
fragments. Conditions in which backgrounded information was refuted were 
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perceived as less felicitous than those in which foregrounded information was 
refuted. For the counterbalanced test items, foreground conditions also 
yielded significantly faster response times. This suggests that the retrieval of 
backgrounded information, which is not being used actively to update the 
conversational record, may result in additional processing load. 
There is also considerable variability between triggers as to the 
acceptability of refuting backgrounded content. Our results suggest that this is 
significantly easier in the case of only than continue or stop, with again and the 
comparative construction yielding numerically intermediate acceptability 
ratings. This might be taken as support for the psychological reality of the 
distinction between resolution and lexical triggers. 
Two important caveats must be taken into account, however, in attempting 
to interpret these findings. First, as discussed above, the status of the prejacent 
of only (e.g. the proposition John went to the library in the sentence Only John 
went to the library) is a theoretically-contested issue. The acceptability ratings 
of only in the background condition could be interpreted as providing support 
for the view that the prejacent is an entailment of only (cf. Horn, 1996 and 
Roberts, to appear). 
Secondly, and more problematically, the differences that were manifest in 
the Background conditions were also exhibited in the Foreground conditions, 
in violation of our expectations. This renders any conclusion about the relative 
behaviour of the presupposition triggers in this experiment necessarily very 
tentative. It could be that the apparent disparity between these conditions is 
attributable simply to the materials in question varying in felicity, which might 
apply to both experimental conditions. An alternative conjecture is that the 
Foreground materials were not optimally felicitous because it is more natural 
to respond to a presupposition-triggering question with a response that also 
acknowledges the presupposition than with one that does not: compare for 
instance (15) and (16). In this case, the infelicity of the Foreground items 
might be independent of the Background items, and thus would not invalidate 
the comparison between presupposition triggers discussed above. 
(15) Q: Did Julia give up smoking? 
 A: ?No, she smokes. 
 
(16) Q: Did Julia give up smoking? 
 A: No, she still smokes. 
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In our ongoing work, we are addressing this issue, with a view to obtaining 
a suitable baseline for comparing the backgrounding behaviour of 
presuppositions (by constructing refutations that are reliably judged to be 
entirely felicitous). 
 
6. General discussion and future directions 
In this paper, we have aimed to give show the potential of experimental work to 
shed light on theoretically-contested aspects of information structure in 
general, and presupposition in particular. It must be acknowledged that this is 
a complex phenomenon, as witnessed both by the extensive theoretical 
literature and the relatively late development of experimental approaches to the 
problem. The above pilot study illustrates both some of the potential of 
empirical work to demonstrate the psychological reality of the distinctions 
posited by theoreticians, and some of the difficulties encountered in 
attempting to operationalise these distinctions in a meaningful way. Our study 
illustrates the difficulty in isolating presuppositions from other types of 
content in actual interpretation, and the individual variability among 
presupposition triggers that seems to elude neat theoretical groupings. 
Empirical work in this field has the potential to throw light on whether the 
classes of presuppositions posited in some approaches (e.g. Zeevat, 1992) are 
coherent, or whether it is more appropriate to situate presuppositions on a 
continuum (as in Kadmon, 2001). In either case, a further question concerns 
the status of presupposition phenomena as a potential semantic universal (cf. 
Von Fintel & Matthewson, 2008). The results from experimental research 
have shown that fine-grained judgements about types of presupposed content 
cannot be obtained solely from introspection. On the surface, it appears that 
presuppositions can take many different forms and be related to the declarative 
content of their triggering sentences in various different ways. If it is true that 
presuppositions can be organised cross-linguistically into a small set of natural 
kinds with a consistent behaviour, that is potentially instructive for our view of 
conversational interaction and indeed cognition. We hope to contribute to the 
cross-linguistic empirical examination of presupposition and information 
backgrounding in future work. 
We also hope to unify this work with research on some of the other open 
questions about presupposition discussed in this paper. For instance, 
presupposition projection is plausibly linked to information backgrounding: 
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we have seen how information may be presented at different levels of 
‘grounding’ in order to achieve particular cognitive effects. The question of 
how this aspect of information structure is used to influence the interlocutor’s 
situation model does not appear to have been tackled in any generality. 
Nevertheless, there is a strong and widely-shared intuition that 
presuppositions may be used to introduce information into the discourse. By 
better understanding how presupposition triggers are processed by speaker 
and hearer, we will better be able to offer an account of the role of 
presupposition in efficient communication. Appeal to experimental data 
should enable research in this field to proceed within a constrained and 
tractable hypothesis space. 
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